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I. The Hebrew Bible
By contemporary accounts, the traditional Jewish Bible is an anthol-
ogy of Hebrew pieces of literature from ancient Israel, Judea, and Bab-
ylon. Its materials—compositions, collections, collated fragments, and
more—span the ninth to second centuries BCE, from the period of As-
syrian domination, through the Babylonian and Persian, and into the
Hellenistic. Sociological and technological developments in the late
sixth century BCE made large, durable parchment scrolls available to
Judean text-professionals, andprompted their idea to use them to store
the valued contents of the smaller, less durable papyrus ones that had
long served and predominated, in particular papyri featuring the na-
tion’s god and heroes. Over several centuries, text-professionals gath-
ered the papyrus remains of earlier periods and contemporary works
too, collating and editing them.1 The literary record from the fifth cen-
tury BCE to the first century CE, in the Persian and Hellenistic periods,
shows that this concentrated, controlled storage—ancient “big data”—
went beyond aiding preservation to facilitate a vibrant culture of mas-
tering thecontents,hermeneuticengagement, adaptation innewworks,
public reading events, literal and political applications, text-centered
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sanctity, and even divine access. Entire Judean communities defined
themselves and distinguished themselves fromothers by their specific
textual corpus and by the interpretations, beliefs, and practices they
anchored in it. For those Judeans, knowledge of the texts was knowl-
edge of the Lord and of theworld he created and continues to control.2
In the ancient papyri gathered up—sophisticated narratives of the
past, pious hymns chanting deeds of yore and plaintive petitions
seeking more, prophecy about dawning times and distant, sage dis-
course on worldly success—the authors of old expressed their own
precious, foundational knowledge of the divine. No abstract proposi-
tions or esoteric insight, such knowledge consists of a set of charac-
teristics deeply integrated with knowledge of the world, its composi-
tion, and itsmechanics, including its humanity. Of no fixed form, this
integrated, embeddedknowledge shiftswith the literarymediumthat
presents it: it is a function of genre.
Tomost contemporary scholars of the Hebrew Bible, genres reflect
public institutions and settings—political, economic, social—each of
which held distinct ideas about the deity and a signature way to ex-
press them, but biblical literature as it is now has been supplemented
and revised at somany points and in somanyways as to disfigure the
texts and occlude the window they provide onto the ancient institu-
tions and settings. To encounter the ancient views of divine knowl-
edge, one must identify the original form and extent of the text and,
behind that, the expression of that original setting in which its artic-
ulationwould have been fullymeaningful. In this view, literature car-
ries the voice of the collective and its speech is that of types—the per-
sonas that represent those collectives. On the one hand, in this view,
literature that looks realistic enough affords one reasonably confident
access to the real past. On the other hand, literature is an impediment
to speech to be overcome, an obstacle to its proper audition and com-
prehension. Authentic knowledge is expressed orally, directly, and
the literary medium, which is but a record or a container, preserves
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a flattened, distorted form of it. Some scholars valorize the supple-
ments and revisions both as creative and as reflective of subsequent
times and interests that can be recovered, but they donot alter the ba-
sic idea of literature as removed from the real, as a misted window
uponwhichwould-be observers have breathed and smearednewpat-
terns throughwhich deludedly to try and glimpse it. To all such schol-
ars, onewho can follow the collective voice can trace collective change,
count causes, account for results, and recount the past; one can nar-
rativize an entire society, write its history, and have encompassing
knowledgeof it, including its divine element. Not only does theHebrew
Bible tell a single encompassing story, but the story told rebounds to
the Hebrew Bible itself, accounting for its current form, which reflects
the unfurling knowledge of the deity.3
In an alternate view, literature does not make a prior event avail-
able or transmit preexisting content, but creates an immediate event—
the reading experience itself. In this event the writing is either read
and heard internally (as in modern times) or read aloud and heard by
an audience (as in ancient). Literature triggers this event by simulating
a speech event, speech that posits a past, a present, or a future andcon-
structs it as it goes. Literature prompts its audience to participate in a
virtual reality. Genres, in this view, are the textual simulation of differ-
ent live speaking situations: a storyteller, a cultural critic and prognos-
ticator, a teacher, a philosopher, a lover, the bereft. Literature, in this
view, has agency. That agency is set inmotion by authors, and authors
can exploit the possibilities afforded by textual simulation to widely
varying effect. They choose their points of verisimilitude and of unre-
ality, where to distract from the artifice and where to accentuate it,
where to indulge the audience’s desire for virtual reality and its ready
suspension of disbelief and where to put the audience to the test.4
In this view, works gathered in the literary treasury that is the He-
brew Bible came to exist through individual authors, who rather than
record or transmit institutional or collective knowledge of the deity,
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drew upon their cultural lore and personal experience in a novel way
to construct knowledge and argue it. The speakers of the texts they
produced, rather than immediately represent a collective, have indi-
viduality. Each simulated speakermimics a knownspeaking situation
and stretches it this way and that, according to the author’s design.
No authors identified themselves; some cast the simulated speaker
as a legendaryfigure, likeMoses,David, or Isaiah. Andeachof the sim-
ulated speakers, given its discrete outline and setting, proposes dis-
tinct knowledge of the deity.
But the biblical treasury primarily comprises treasury-like works—
curated collations and simple collections produced by editors—and
most of the authored works hide in these, woven all together or jux-
taposed alongside each other. Havingworkednot to produce a consis-
tent level of simulation and argument but to gather by rolling sets of
criteria, association-clusters around specific persons or types, editors
producedcompositeworks thatobscuredvoicing, suggestednew, com-
plex super-genres—new forms of divine knowledge—and, so difficult
to synthesize, facilitated selective retelling inyet newworks (in ancient
times) or historicizing the embedded works and the real-life phenom-
ena seemingly made available by them (in modern times).5
This emphasis on authors and arguments, on textualized speakers
and genres, on editors and complexes, and on the historical role of
technology and society in literary culture, foils contemporary attempts
to narrativize ancient society and divine knowledge on the basis of
literary remains. It recasts the Hebrew Bible from a story perceptible
to contemporary readers to an ancient treasury for ancient readers
that might be used so again, entirely subject to new realities—new
mores, new aims, and new modes. The new review below of several
works in the biblical treasury from this point of view aims to illus-
trate how biblical authors, who mostly refer to their deity by the
proper name yhwh “Yahweh” or the general descriptions elohim
“God” or ha’elohim “The God,” configure divine knowledge each in a
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different way; how they challenge existing rubrics and innovate; and
how they exploit the literary medium to do so. It is a review of genre-
makers and genre-breakers.
II. Kings and Prophets on History
The most visible set today of ancient claims to divine knowledge is
that of royal figures. Across the entire region of Southwest Asia, from
Judea and Moab through the kingdoms of the Hittites and Arameans,
to Assyria and Babylonia, ancient rulers employed stone but also
other media, enduring and perishable alike, to recount their massive
deeds—of conquest, security, procurement, construction, commerce,
wealth, justice, and education: order and civilization—accomplished
with divine charge, power, and wisdom.6 Literary works and frag-
ments throughout the Hebrew Bible show Judean rulers and like-
minded authors to have participated fully in this culture of divine
knowledge based in the material and sensory.7 So certain of this his-
torical knowledgewere they, in which control over the landscape and
change to it wrought by human hand bespeak divine cause, that they
took the royal realm as the ground for construing the divine and then,
in return, considered the royal realm a miniature of the divine, a di-
minished imitation.8 And so certain was this sensory knowledge that
even political and social critics, authors simulating prophetic figures,
ground prophetic knowledge in physical and visual proximity.
At one point in the book of Isaiah (6:1–13)—which gathers materi-
als allegedly spoken by the prophet Isaiah in eighth–seventh centu-
ries BCE Judea, told of him, or otherwise associated with him—Isaiah
speaks in the first-person voice about an event from long, long ago,
when he found himself standing in Yahweh’s palatial, hypersensory
space peopled by fiery creatures, filling with smoke, thundering with
their cries of praise for Yahweh, whose robes overrun the space.
Yahweh had a mission and needed an agent, but for Isaiah to volun-
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teer and speak for Yahweh, his lips first had to be seared with a coal
from Yahweh’s altar, too hot even for a seraph to hold in its hands.
The mission, though, was to disorient the people, dull their senses
completely, and lead them to their doom. The author of this text
may mean to explain years of a failed policy,9 but does so by a con-
trast in sensory mettle: the prophet Isaiah can perceive the divine
and therefore represent him, while a people so dull can merit only
further dulling. Many other texts in the Hebrew Bible similarly de-
ploy the motifs of acute senses, physical proximity, and a confidant’s
access to divine presence in order to curate authenticity. All feature a
declaration of having seen (Hebrew r-ʾ -h, used occasionally for other
senses too).10
In a world of sensory knowledge by ruler and prophet alike, coa-
lescing circumstances prompted one author to deny the logic, in a
distinctwork foundat Isaiah 40–48.11 Cyrus of Persia had recently cap-
tured Babylon (539 BCE) and explained it as the will of the Babylonian
god Marduk, who appointed him to restore religious order.12 Expatri-
ate Judeans—those who arrived in Babylonia in the forced migration
of elites in 597 BCE, those who arrived in the forced migration of the
broader population in 586BCE, and those born to thedeportees in Bab-
ylonia—surely acknowledged the familiar and powerful claim: who
but the successful king would know the source and purpose of his suc-
cess? But the author of Isaiah 40–48 set out to convince the commu-
nity of expatriates that Yahweh not Marduk stands behind Cyrus’s
success and that he does so to lead them to Judea, restore its towns,
and rebuildYahweh’s ownhome there, the temple (44:24–45:7).His ar-
gument works by denying the logic of sensory, especially visual,
knowledge. Those espousing the circular logic that discovers divine
will—what they see generates backward what they know—also en-
gage in the most absurd denial of sure knowledge: they employ every
one of their senses and skills patiently anddiligently to sculpt a statue
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but then deny the entire process and worship it as inhabited and an-
imated by a god (44:6–20). The senses mislead and they are misused.
The truth is in several inverses: Yahweh has no earthly home, no hu-
man corps, no king, but thesemakeupnobasis for judginghis potency
and relevance anyway. The deeds of old sung about for ages and never
denied continue to herald deeds to come; embodied, sense-bound, and
mortal creatures have not the perspective to determine the creator’s
will, plans, methods, and means, when he sets a plan in motion or
brings it to a close. Creatures are but characters in the history he au-
thors; their senses senseless, unable to identify an effect and link it
to a cause, they are blind, deaf, mute, and ineffectual. The only point
of access for the human creature, therefore, is one of human will, the
will to hear and to obey (both within the semantic range of š-m-ʿ , like
“listen”).
True to the argument, the author of this text complicates the no-
tion of hearing, chiefly in two ways. First, all the normal channels of
direct communication are recast as highly mediated and dynamic.
Theprophet doesnothearYahwehstating clear instructions to afixed
council of subordinate divinities. Rather, hehearsmultiple voices (qol)
coming at first from nowhere identifiable. They coalesce and crystal-
lize into a single voice as they speak, and that speech cites Yahweh,
who is sheer will (40:1–8). The prophet hears it and relays it, gives it
human voice. At one richly ambiguous point (48:16), he declares that
Yahweh sent him either together with his spirit-wind (ruah)̣ or as his
spirit-wind. Second, the prophet does not recount an aural event that
has occurred in the past, recent or distant. He reports in real time on
what he hears as he hears it. Several models suggest themselves for
such a text: (1) a letter, in which the addressee treats the voicing as
if it occurs with the reading and identifies the wording with the au-
thor, although the author wrote it in the past and is not directly pre-
sent; (2) communication across a valley, in which the recipient can
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see the physical gestures of will and effort by the source, wind carries
the voice across the valley, possibly echoing as several voices, and the
recipient then hears it; and (3) a spirit medium, who gives real-time
voice to the will and sentiment of the divine or otherworldly.
Textualizing andanalyzing prophecy thisway, the author canhave
Yahweh, through the voice and through the prophet, refer to the
prophet, such that the prophet voices speech that is about him. True
to the argument, when Yahweh does so, he describes his human her-
ald as devoid of the normal human senses, because hearing Yahweh
is not an act of body-bound perception but of will (42:19). The effect of
this textual simulation of a real-timeprophetic eventmakes the text’s
audience the direct recipients of prophecy, as if they made oracular
inquiry and receive now divine response—each and every time the
text is read. What do recent events mean? That expatriate Judeans
in Babylon should ready themselves to move to Judea.
III. Poetic Proverb and Prose Philosophy on the Quotidian
The royalfigure lent itself to an additional formof knowledge, the ver-
bal arts. As the prose narrative winds its way through the book of
Kings, the narrator describes the young king Solomon having earned
divine wisdom, the power of discernment, through humility and pru-
dence, then applying it (1 Kings 3:3–28). Facedwith two indistinguish-
able women, who live together in the samemanless house, gave birth
together, and after a crib-death now both claimmotherhood over the
single live infant, Solomon cuts the Gordian knot through a deep-
structure play on the word for both cutting and deciding (g-z-r). His
ruling, the decision to cut the live baby in two and award eachwoman
one half, elicits compassion in the real mother, who withdraws her
claim, and satisfaction in themother of the dead infant, who declares
an equal outcome of two bereft mothers ideal. The narrator follows
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up, portraying Solomon as, infused with divine wisdom, one who
“spoke” (d-b-r) three thousand proverbs, “had” (h-y-h 1 l-) one thou-
sand and five songs, and “discoursed” (d-b-r) on the entire plant and
animal kingdoms (1 Kings 5:9–14). He mastered life through lan-
guage.
Solomon the master speaker figures prominently in the book of
Proverbs, a collection of about nine works that together make up a
compendium of types of discourse about the way of life, its chall-
enges, traps, and rewards, its poetry and its irony, and how tomaster
it.13 He appears at the head of the book,which in a preamble promises
that its content—whether the entire book or the first work in it re-
mains unclear—will not only help one live life successfully but also
cultivate intellect and, ultimately, sharpen linguistic skill. The open-
ing work contains a series of pieces framed as the direct-address
speech of parents to their child; they advise by laying out extended
scenarios or lining up pithy sayings, which carry the knowledge of ex-
perience and transmit it to the next generation. The next work, the
largest in the book by far and likewise headed by an attribution to Sol-
omon, presents unframed, rambling strings of one-liners, like a trea-
sury of quotables that the quick-witted would know how to select,
wield, and deploy. The other sections offer varieties of witty speech,
from riddles to poems, in various sequences by varied speakers with
varying, often exotic attributions. But they are all animated by the
idea and simultaneously express it that speech can capture everyday
life, its rhythm and its rhyme, by reducing it to representative images
or illustrative scenarios of cause and effect in sayings of balance and
measure—as poetry. This poetry, alternately presented as “wisdom”
and personified as “(Lady) Wisdom,” is identified with Yahweh him-
self; it is his gift to humanity, a medium of insight and control, a tree
of life (3:13–26; 8:1–36).
The author of the book of Ecclesiastes, orQohelet, explodes the clarity
and the causality, the symmetry and the poetry, of proverbial speech,
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and presents a broken chain of transmission, in which a teacher ad-
dressing his pupil (perceptible in 1:1–2; 7:27; 12:8–14) quotes the long,
rambling, iconoclastic “last lecture”he hadheard fromhis own teacher.
The uncertainty of knowledge, in this work, the provisional nature of
thought, begins with this quoted character, who is referred to at times
by the proper noun “Qohelet,” a particular person (1:1–2, 12:9–10), and
at others by the descriptor “the qohelet,” a type of person, one defined
by a particular activity, that of drawing crowds (7:27; 12:8).14 Both the
quoter and the quoted refer to him as a son of David and king over all
Israel in Jerusalem (1:1, 12), which suggests Solomon, but three times
the character also declares having far surpassed all thosewhopreceded
him in Jerusalem (1:16; 2:7, 9), the rhetoric of which requires a long line,
not just David. He says of himself, “I was king” (1:12);15 former US pres-
identsmight travel theworld lecturingwisely, verbosely, and lucratively
on life, but former kings are dead kings in the ancient world. At an early
point in the speech (after chap. 2), the royal voice dissipates entirely
into that of the sage; the quoter too comes to refer to the quoted as
a “sage” not as king (12:9–12). The author shifts, re-presents, and re-
constructs the figure—repersonifies it—as the text goes; he values
evocativeness over realism. Quite literally, Qohelet the qohelet is a fig-
ure of speech: he speaks and he exists as others speak of him.16
The uncertainty of knowledge and the fragility of its transmission
occur most potently at the work’s end. The author does not give the
pupil voice, but when the teacher concludes, the pupil’s face must
register shock and dismay, because the teacher promptly works to re-
verse all he has just quoted with a string of comments (12:9–14):
(a) Qohelet in his time did compose many pithy proverbs to educate
thepeople, asbefits theadroit scholar thathewas; (b) a single coherent,
thoughtful, and, yes, concerned mind does stand behind the grating
bunches of barbs that seem unmanageably to cut against one another,
for it is but the nature of such agglomerations to be unwieldy and
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tangled up; (c ) toomuch collating and copying—thewearisome lot of
the scholar or the scholar-in-training—can embitter a person; and
(d ) when all is said and done, best not to allow the intellectual exer-
cises and acrobatics of scholarship to undermine one’s subservience
to God and observance of his commands, the truemeasure of aman.
Not only has this teacher failed to transmit his teaching to his pupil—
the wisdom of his own teacher—but he has evidently misjudged the
readiness of his pupil, a categorical failure; the proverbial three-ply
cord said reliably to hold fast (4:9–12) threatens to snap.
And the uncertainty of knowledge is precisely what Qohelet de-
scribes. Qohelet talks about his past, where he began, realizations
that shook him, a journey he undertook, and the understanding he
achieved (1:1–3:15). He says he is a former king over all Israel, who
saw allmanner of success. He builtmassively, gathered a teeming en-
tourage and household, amassed farm animals manifold, planted
luxuriantly, produced crops in abundance, brought in preciousmetals
and exotic goods, commanded a diplomatic army, owned the finest
talent in entertainment, and spared himself no self-indulgence. He
far surpassed all who came before him, he says, in Jerusalem; he
was the poster child for proverbial wisdom, for lessons learned with
the listening ear and transmitted, for the road to riches, for mastery
of the reason and the rhyme of life. He was the princely counterpart
to the female personification of wisdom in the book of Proverbs, the
one she beckons and guarantees health, wealth, and happiness. But
he had a series of realizations that challenged traditional, proverbial
wisdom. He came to seewith his eyes that death does not distinguish
between the successful and the sad sack. It renders assets useless and
the effort to gain them fruitless. Nor canQohelet guarantee his assets’
fate, that they will not be squandered by his successor, that he him-
self will possess them until his death, or that God has not used him
to favor another. A contemplative variant of the superhuman Gilga-
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mesh,Qoheletwashauntednot by the certainty of death but by theun-
certainty of everything else. So Qohelet resolved to examine the pro-
verbial wisdom by which he had lived—cause and effect, comparison
and application, restraint and reward, the reason and rhyme of life—
and ascertain its difference from folly, for if even a king could not guar-
antee such a thing, who could?
Three aspects of Qohelet’s speech manifest his empiricist’s denial
of proverbial rhyme and reason: (1) his emphatic grasping through
sight (r-ʾ -h) rather than hearing/obeying (š-m-ʿ ), a heightened sense
of self marked by the first-person pronoun, and “talking with” his
“heart”; (2) his citation and negation of proverbial utterances; and
(3) his resolute use of prose over against the poetry of proverbial utter-
ances. The coincidence between form and content is not serendipi-
tous. The parallel structure of poetic lines expresses by implication,
by inviting comparison, and it generates synthesis. Poetry works by
its patterning of speech; the patterns generate knowledge and under-
standing in the interplaybetween repetitionandvariation,betweenex-
pectation and surprise. This kind of thought process characterizes pro-
verbial wisdom, which represents an entire set of related scenarios in
the formof one paradigmatic case that embeds a principle that applies
to them all. Proverbial wisdom draws on the patterns identified in life,
reduces them to a formula, and controls outcomes. Qohelet rejects the
existence of patterns and their implications of predictable, bankable
causality. There are only accidents and outright repetitions, utterly
useless repetitions that cause no change, that produce nothing. Often,
when Qohelet does wax proverbial and poetical, he is being ironical.
Qohelet reviews many of the conventional pieces of wisdom he
had examined on a host ofmatters in a variety of settings, citing them
to discard them, even composing his own to parody them. Proverbial
wisdom trades in life’s patterns, formulas of action and result, guar-
antees of work and yield: who lives in its constraints will have no
complaints. It expresses them in pithy sayings of balance and mea-
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sure, in puzzling series of poetic lines, and in whole poems of voiced
instruction. And these offer quotidian, quirky, or cryptic situations
that only the clever can enjoy, decode, and apply. Qohelet came to
deny the proverbial predictability of life, the rule of causality, wisdom
through formula. In his newer, prosaic view, life comprises utterly
useless repetition and singular accidents. The wise thought the prov-
erb ineffectual and self-pricking in the mouth of the fool, like the legs
of the lame and the rose-stem in the hand of the drunk (Prov. 26:7, 9);
Qohelet found the proverb itself useless and the wise self-pricking.
Qohelet begins his lecture (1:1–11) by highlighting the useless rep-
etition, illusory dynamism, and utter stasis of theworld’s elements in
their spheres (the earth, the sun in the sky above it, thewind at its sur-
face, and the water running through it and below) and of human cog-
nitive organs and processes (speaking, seeing, and hearing). Then he
turns to the accidental dimension, treating at length its relentless at-
tack on human knowledge and control.
In one instructive instance Qohelet cites a proverbial piece of wis-
dom, “who does as told misfortune will not know,”17 a poetic line
whose rhythm and rhyme serve its reason (cause and effect); then
he offers the more knowing insight born of experience, “but timing
and course of action does the astuteminddiscern” (8:5).Mindless obe-
dience does not guarantee good fortune and results; the wise impro-
vise. Qohelet’s quip balances the proverb, creating a couplet of thought
and counter-thought, one that turns on the root “to know, knowledge”
(y-d-ʿ ). The proverb applies the root to a passive experience—an expe-
rience to be avoided, knowledge never to have; the quip reapplies it to
active participation in the event, shaping it and turning it to advan-
tage. The quip also pits “course of action” (mišpat)̣ against “command-
ment” (misẉah), which typically it complements. Qohelet does not end
the point here, but elaborates (8:6–7): every endeavor has its unique
timing and course of action; on the whole fate and misfortune over-
whelm a man, who knows not what will come next, and when it does
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comenoonewill tell him it iswhat isnext, consequence, andnot some-
thing wholly other, coincidence.
Similarly, earlier in the lecture (7:1–6a), Qohelet first quotes a pro-
verbial series about values and practices. Reputation (which subsists)
trumps rubbing oil (which dissolves); the day of death (one of tri-
umph), that of birth (all needs and no deeds); the house of mourning,
that of feasting,whendeath and reputation are on instructive display.
So too, vexation trumps joy and chastisement tomfoolery for their ed-
ifying effect. Then (7:6b) Qohelet punctures the series with a counter-
proverb that the wise are themselves fully susceptible to whim and
greed: “But this too is untenable, for ungainly gain makes fools of
the wise and a gift dispenses with sense.”18 Even those recognizing
circumstances cannot control them.
Later on in his speech (9:11), in classic proverbial fashion Qohelet
offers a symmetrical list of paradigmatic cases to illustrate a counter-
proverbial point of his, that neither innate talents nor learned skills
guarantee success—not to the fleetest does the race ever go, nor does
the valiant victory always know, not to the cleverest does the money
ever flow, nor does the wise stand always in grace’s glow—because
“chance and circumstance befall them all.” Worse, he adds (9:12), no
better than trapped fish and snared birds do people caught by misfor-
tune grasp their situation when it suddenly befalls them.
In a fourth example, Qohelet sums up a proverb he has just exam-
ined in the context of a parable of his ownmaking (9:14–16), about the
advantage of the wise over weapons (9:18a), then follows it up with
the irony that a singlemisstep can ruin a huge advantage (9:18b). This
leads him to compose his own proverbial, parabolic, parallelistic cou-
plet (10:1), that the intricate plan is foiled and the delicate article
spoiled by the most common and random of things, the bug in the
computer, the fly in the ointment, which he not only expresses se-
mantically but also models syntactically: “Dead flies will rot, bubble
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the perfumer’s ointment; more precious than wisdom, than honor is
but a bit of folly.” The form of the proverb illustrates its message: the
nearly perfect parallelism is marred by doubled elements lacking the
mere conjunction “and” in both its lines. The wry observation and its
ironic formulation show Qohelet a master of the proverbial line and
list and a disaster for proverbial wisdom; he can compose with the
cleverest and undercut the concept of doing so, all at the same time.
Finally, Qohelet famously observes in a proverbial line that every-
thing has its time, then illustrates with fourteen pairs of human phe-
nomena, the repetitive form of which lulls the audience into a sense
of order and balance, of rhythm and rhyme, of symmetry sublime
(3:1–9). But Qohelet breaks the spell and bitingly goads: “So what is
the point of doing any work at all?” (3:10). This stinger posed as a rhe-
torical question suggests that in fact Qohelet quotes a wisdom-poem
in order to reject it. The case, however, may be more interesting than
that. The poem’s list has long stymied efforts to account for all the
items selected to appear in it; to explain all the pairings in it; to trace
the order within each pair, from pair to pair, and from section to sec-
tion; to make sense of the deviations from the poem’s pattern; to de-
termine the very syntax of the lines, which from the perspective of
the beginning must comprise a series of separate sentences but from
the perspective of the endmust make up a single long sentence; and,
above all, to render the key term for “time” (ʿet) uniformly. As it turns
out, all the nagging departures from the poem’s pull toward perfect
patterning, the poem’s stubborn resistance to its own symmetry, ex-
emplify Qohelet’s vexed observation that the most intricate plan is
foiled and the most intricate article spoiled by the most common
and random of things, the bug in the computer, dead flies in the oint-
ment. That this observation so aptly describes the proverbial poem
and thatQohelet composes the deliciouslyflawedproverbial linewith
ironic intent suggest together that Qohelet composes the poem as a
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parody. It mimics the wise, who absurdly persist in seeking patterns
and willfully ignore patterns’ inherent flaws and necessary failure.
Where they see patterns, seasons, reliable repetitions whose identifi-
cation can be turned to one’s advantage, Qohelet sees a mirage, and
beyond themirage—incalculable, irreducible, unyielding luck and fate.
Qohelet satirizes the human penchant for patternizing life though it
has a way always of going awry. Symmetry, he argues, can never sup-
press serendipity.
Qohelet’s radical breakwith constructive knowledge breaks aswell
with God—always the personified concept “God,” never the distinct
persona “Yahweh”—whom he presents as inscrutable, unpredictable,
untraceable, unaccountable, and unknowable, indeed willfully and tor-
turously so. He keeps humans distractedly busy, guessing anxiously,
and ever exposed to the hazards of fate—all, Qohelet essays in a nega-
tivemode, so they fearhim (1:13; 2:24–26; 3:10–15; 5:17–19; 6:1–2; 7:13–14;
8:17–9:1; 11:5). It is rather unclear, he says with bracing clarity, what
happens to the human spirit, the life-essence, when a person dies and
whether it and its conditions differ from those of an animal (3:18–21).
In framing theqohelet’sphilippic asavery longquotewithinabarely-
there but dramatic teacher-student conversation, as a massive les-
son unlearned and quickly retracted, the author of the work allows
the audience to forget the frame or even tomiss it, to feel directly ad-
dressed by the qohelet, and to yield to the force of the disquieting ar-
gument, and then at the end to distance itself from it. As a result, both
the author and the audience can have their cake and eat it too—enter-
tain a profound and profoundly disruptive thought as an experiment
and also plausibly deny it. On the one hand, the trick is a linguistic
one, uniquely facilitated by the textualmedium. To read the text again
is to experience the entire sequence all over again, the forgetting, the
accepting, the denying. And yet, to have understood the thought once
is never to be able truly to relinquish it, only to act as if having done so,
to live impossibly between spaces. Instead of grasping certain divine
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knowledge or with certainty denying it, Qohelet says, life is a dialectic,
like the experience of textual simulation itself.
IV. Narrative Omniscience
The Hebrew Bible contains multiple works of prose narrative voiced
by a third-person, external narrator of extensive knowledge and in-
sight.19 Scholars have debated the origin and significance of this om-
niscient prose narrator, variously emphasizing its opposition to oral
poetic polytheistic myth;20 its somewhat critical, secular cast;21 its
distinctiveness from royally voiced literature, monumental and other,
together with its national perspective;22 and its convergence with the
divine perspective.23 More descriptively, the narrative form combines
the advantages of the oral bard with those of the written chronicle—
a complete story (rather than aimless sequences of episodes) told in
all the dry factuality of the prosaic voice (rather than the poetic, edify-
ing voice of performance)—such that its narrators know the state of the
universe when Yahweh began creating it; Yahweh’s internal senti-
ments and reasoning; arcane knowledge and hoary lore, exotic as well
as local; the origins of behavior, names, expressions, practices, and
professions; ancient terminology, chronology, genealogy, and geogra-
phy; and the sweep of extensive historical processes, including Yah-
weh’s role and reasoning in them. Regardless of whether these narra-
tiveworks counted as historiography or fiction at the time, the authors
constructed the narrators as earnest and reliable. The narrators hold
particular values and views, which inform their knowledge of what
constitutes an event, its beginning point and conclusion, its causes
and effects, and its significance. They might express ironic thoughts
or view certain characters ironically, but they champion the form in
which they speak and its salient feature, the construction of causality
in time, which in their case frequently turns on Yahweh.
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Similar to the way the author of Qohelet challenges the typological
knowledge claimed and produced by the poetic proverb—the way
things are and how things happen—the author of Job challenges the
knowledge of the singular claimed and produced by prose narrative—
the way something was and how something happened. Similar, too,
to the way the author of Qohelet has Qohelet mimic proverbial voices
to demonstrate their fatuousness and has the framing scene present
a failed chain of transmission, the author of Job presents an unreliable
narrator, who tells a broken story with just enough threading between
its parts to tempt the audience to insist on its coherence, and a main
character who faces the challenge of refusing to tell a story, insisting
on the brokenness of events, a sequencewith no consequence. The au-
thor argues by way of poignant, multileveled illustration that human
beings—the audience of the story no less than characters in it—will
stop at nothing to make sense by narrativizing, by sequencing events
to imply cause and effect. Markedly shifting styles, a detached, ironic,
anddiscontinuousnarrator, and a compromised, inconsistentYahweh
all keep the audience off balance, struggling to find interpretive and
ethical purchase and to retell the story in a coherent and satisfyingway.
Because the story of Job concerns the very phenomenon of story-
telling, its interpretation turns precisely on howone retells it. Accord-
ingly, my analysis consists of a guided retelling. The story concerns a
pious man in the land of Utz (southeast of Israel and Judea) named
Job, whom Yahweh tests by way of terrible calamity, who debates
with his friends at length about the right response, and whom Yah-
weh restores. With these two names the author already signals the
fictive nature of the work, that it puts the audience to the test, that
it presents a thought-experiment about knowledge. The name Utz
(ʿus)̣ reverberates with words for wisdom (ʿesạh) and counsel (y-ʿ-s)̣,
which appear throughout the book and are its theme, and the con-
sonants in the name Job (ʾ -y-w-b) make up both the exclamatory word
of suffering (ʾ -b-w-y), which represents Job’s predicament, and also
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the noun “adversary” (ʾ -w-y-b), namely, Job’s position as a direct chal-
lenge to the wise and their traditional ideas of God, like the three
friends, and as a direct challenge to God, whom Job calls upon to ap-
pear and justify him.
The story has three parts: (1) a stable backdrop against which a
complication emerges; (2) the main character’s response; and (3) clo-
sure, the sense that the character has handled the challenge, that the
complication has beenmanaged, and that a stable state of affairs has
returned. They differ from each other so strikingly that scholars posit
that two different works have been combined, one comprising parts 1
and 3 and another at part 2. The theory, though, does not account for
the full set of phenomena: parts 1 and 3 have crucial points of discon-
tinuity; the three parts do not shift neatly and sharply from one to an-
other; features of one part show up at crucial points and in crucial
ways in another; and important plot elements carry over from one
to another to create interdependence. Rather, the author has crafted
a story that hangs by several knotted threads, because storytelling it-
self is at issue.
In the first part (roughly chaps. 1–2), the narrator tells about a re-
markably conscientious and successful man, Job, whose ten privi-
leged children could afford to feast together on a regular basis and
did so in rotation, each one hosting all the others. At the end of each
round, Job would hold a day of his own, offering Yahweh one animal
for each child, in case any had had troublesome thoughts in the in-
terim. One day, Yahweh’s council of divine beings convenes. Yahweh
speaks with one of them in particular about this remarkably consci-
entious Job, the satạn, who goads Yahweh to put Job to the test. An im-
possibly quick series of calamities decimates everything Job had
cultivated and safeguarded for years, including all the people of his
household—family members and subordinates alike. In a second




Though the narrative depicts a horrific scene, it carries the flat,
detached, even ironic tone of a caricature, that unique combination
of folk and mythic found in ancient materials. Job is perfect in be-
havior. The numbers around him are roundly perfect, based on seven
and ten: seven sons and three daughters; 7,000 sheep and 3,000 cam-
els; 500 teams of cattle and 500 donkeys. A divine council is described
casually, neither through complex prophetic mediation nor prompted
by significant drama in the human realm. Yahweh, allegedly in con-
trol, is manipulable and brings manipulation upon himself. He takes
pride inafineperson, Job; admits to a logical argument that a testmight
be worthwhile; complains when Job passes that the test was done
fruitlessly as if the suffering it entailed was not worthwhile; then ad-
mits to the logic that another round of testing is warranted. Yahweh
creates trouble for his pride and glory, does not thinkmatters through,
changes his mind on what is worthwhile suffering, and comes across
as less than majestic and august. This portrayal is disturbing for a
work that seems to be about divine justice. The satạn—literally “antag-
onist” or “snare”—is a dynamic semi-villain who knows how to push
Yahweh’s buttons. The narrator who tells the story does so in a for-
malistic, highly repetitious, and disjointed way, as if unmoved by the
horror unfolding and uninvested in the story he is telling, as when
he relates the divine council reconvening (1:6–12; 2:1–6), when he re-
lates the various calamities befalling Job and his household (1:13–19),
and when he casually repeats the blithe expression “one day” to se-
quence them (1:6, 13; 2:1). Wordplay, in which “the satạn” (s-t-̣n) describes
his own activity as scouting the land (š-w-t)̣ and Yahweh accuses him of
having incited him fruitlessly (s-w-t), produces such aesthetic pleasure
as to distract from the horrific content of the story.
Repetition, a downright unusual cascade of personas echoing one
another, works atmultiple levels, at first sounding trite, at points poi-
gnant, and on reflection illustrating how speech can cross the divine/
humanandnarrator/character divides. (1) Thenarrator begins by say-
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ing of Job, “Now that man was consistent and straight, mindful and
scrupulous” (1:1), and Yahweh uses these exact words to describe
Job to the satạn twice (1:8; 2:3). (2) In describing the onset of the ca-
lamities, the narrator says that Job’s “sons and daughters were eating
and drinking wine at the house of the eldest” (1:13). The last of the se-
ries of survivors, the one who comes from that very feast, tells Job
in the very same words, “your sons and daughters were eating and
drinking wine at the house of the eldest” (1:18). (3) After the calami-
ties, Yahweh complains to the satạn that Job “persists in his fidelity”
(2:3), and the satạn replies by sharpening his earlier claim (1:9–11): di-
rect discomfort and Job “will curse you to your face” (2:4–5). When the
next level of suffering comes to Job, and he writhes in the dirt to try
to dull his body’s pain, Job’s wife combines the words of Yahweh and
the satạn and says to Job, “You persist in your fidelity; curse God and
die” (2:9).
The sudden appearance of Job’s wife, the realization that she did
not die, and the sense—sheerly due to her omission—that she has
come through (physically) unscathed all put the narrator in a posi-
tively dubious light. Through the description of all that Job had and
lost, howcouldhehave left outmentioningher, andnow that hedoes,
howso tangentially?Whynot describeher circumstances, pain, ques-
tions, and accusations? The narrator quotes her remark to Job, “You
persist in your fidelity; curse God and die!” but leaves it ambiguous
whether she supports Job and wants to help him or blames him. Does
Job suffer additionally because of her, either because she is suffering
on his account or because she challenges him to give up? Not taking
thiswife andmother seriously as a character undercuts the narrator’s
pathos and earnestness, how real the calamity is to him. The disjunc-
tion between the narrator’s style and the disturbing content produces
awry, even ironic effect.What kindof narrator is so casual and callous
about a troubling story that ought to produce pathos? Onewhowould
seem to be winking at the narratee, an ironic one.
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In the transition toward the second part (2:11–3:1)—still in prose—
three friends come to console Job; they sit with him in silent horror.
After a week, Job breaks the silence with a speech—in verse—that
shocks the friends into action, and they begin several rounds of de-
bate with him about his predicament (3:2–32:1). Each friend presup-
poses and makes the argument—proposes the story—that if all this
happened to Job he must have deserved it, and that if he refuses to
see that and fess up, he is responsible for perpetuating and deepening
the situation. At the very least, he should admit a possible, forgotten
offense, for to think a human can be somindful and so perfect and all-
remembering all the time represents the absolute height of arrogance.
It is unhuman; it is divine. But Job denies having slipped or having
forgotten. He insists he has done nothing to deserve this. There are
not causes; there is no such story here.
Whereas until this point in the story Job accepts what befalls him,
as said twice by the narrator (1:22; 2:10b) and once by Job in rather
sharp reply to his wife (2:10a), Job in this section considers himself
trapped in a courtroom gone terribly wrong, where the persecutor,
the accused, the witness, and the judge are all one, Yahweh. If Job’s
misery is taken by others to mean he deserves what has befallen
him but he is certain he does not deserve it, then he is being slan-
dered. So he calls upon Yahweh to appear and acknowledge his pre-
dicament by declaring that Job did not bring his misery upon himself.
After a surprise fourth person, Elihu, appears out of nowhere and be-
rates the three friends, not for being terrible consolers, but for failing
to get Job to admit and repent (32:2–37:24), Yahweh himself appears
and speaks to Job “from the whirlwind” (38:1–42:6). On the one hand,
he berates Job for his audacity in summoning him. On the other, he
does not say that Job deserves his suffering. One could make the case
that this kind of appearance answers Job’s call, exactlywhat he had in
mind.
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There is no action at all in this part, just speech, a multiparty de-
bate characterized by long speeches in verse, with all the techniques
and devices of biblical verse on full display. As in a martial arts film,
each friend takes a turn at Job and Job parries, in a kind of controlled
melee. Job replies after each friend, then the next one goes: Eliphaz
then Job, then Bildad then Job, then Zophar then Job. There’s a com-
plete second round, then a third, at the end ofwhich the all-new char-
acter Elihu suddenly speaks up, after which Yahweh himself enters
the conversation and speaks to Job “from the whirlwind.” They too
have several rounds. Yahweh describes creating the world andmain-
taining it, and challenges Job to match his sense of justice with what
he knows about such things. Job relents. Yahweh presses the point
and Job admits in terms that repeat Yahweh’s own opening words.
There are several important points of continuity between these
high-stakes rounds of theologizing and the opening set of scenes, be-
tween the second and first parts. The narrator carefully lays tracks for
Job’s transition from accepting to challenging. After the first round of
attack, the narrator says, “Through all of this, Job did not sin or cast
aspersions on God” (1:22), but after the second, “Through all this, Job
did not sin with his lips” (2:10); the contrast suggests a rising tide, a
dam readying to break, which builds over a week of pregnant silence
between Job and his friends, and finally bursts (3:1). Moreover, when
the narrator introduces Job’s speech he does so slyly, as if the as-
persions are finally about to pass through his lips and he will curse
God, but then he presents what feels like a twelfth-hour twist: “After
that”—a week of miserable, possibly accusatory silence before his
friends—“Job opened his mouth and cursed” not God but “his day”
(3:1), namely, the day of his birth: would that he never had lived (3:3–
22). Having begun the direct quoting of the debaters, the narrator
comes forward minimally, only to introduce each of the speakers in
turn. However, at the end of Job’s final, extended speech to his friends,
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the narrator makes the unusually formal announcement, “here end the
words of Job” (31:40), which sounds detached and has a deflating effect.
Moreover, he then provides the inside view that the three friends gave
up speaking at this point because they saw that Jobwas too convinced
of being righteous (32:1), which fleetingly sideswith them, as if forget-
ting the precipitating scenes.
The ironic stance evoked by the author in the portrayal of Job and
Yahweh in the opening scenes also returns, at the very climax of the
debates. When Yahweh finally appears and thunders at Job (38:1–
40:2), Job replies in abject humility, saying there is really nothing for
him to say, and yet, he does so rather loquaciously, in away that ques-
tions his sincerity: “Yes, I ammade a lightweight. What could I reply?
I have put my hand over my mouth. I have said a piece and shall not
speak again, two and I shall not continue” (40:4–5). His hand is over his
mouth but he keeps talking. He said a piece anddoes keep talking, two
and there is more yet. And who announces that their hand is over
theirmouth?Werehedoing that, Yahwehwould see it. Only someone
with a readership announces that. An earnest, realistic character is
not supposed to know or acknowledge he or she is being read. Simi-
larly, this admission by Job does not suffice for Yahweh, who then re-
peats himself at length in new terms (40:6–41:26), until Job states yet
again his lowliness (42:1–6)—this time by elegantly reusing Yahweh’s
thunderous opening words (42:3–4; 38:2–3).
In fact, the entire verse debate occurs inunusually difficultHebrew,
withmany forms and roots known especially fromAramaic. This has
generated many questions and theories about the book: Was it origi-
nally written in another language, especially Aramaic? Did its author
live in a timeor in a regionwith adistinctHebrewdialect? But it seems
part of the literary effect; it is often a feature of poetry to use unusual
speech, which can include elements that sound foreign, elements
that sound archaic, and also elements that sound entirely new.24 In
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the case of this story, which sets all the characters in Utz, near or in
Edom, the idea is the equivalent of having them speak with a foreign
accent; they aremeant to sound vaguely Edomite or “Eastern.”The ef-
fect of all that foreign-sounding verse-speech keeps the audience at-
tentive to and engaged in the literary quality of the work. Focusing
the audience on the artistry at play in the extensive debate has the ef-
fect of distracting them, helping them to forget the specific terms of
the precipitating scenes, which serves the discontinuity of the con-
clusion.
After Yahweh’s conversation with Job, the story begins the transi-
tion to the third part. Yahweh turns to one of Job’s three friends, chas-
tising the three of them, vindicating Job to them, and insisting they set
things aright with him (42:6–9). On the one hand, this segment con-
cludes the debate scene; on the other, the narrator comes forward
again, he employs a disjunctive formula normally reserved to intro-
duce a new scene, “After Yahweh said these things to Job,” and the
segment occurs entirely in prose.
The story concludes with Yahweh bringing about Job’s full restora-
tion (42:10–17), in the terms of the losses from the story’s opening and
with its folktale feel. Job had lost seven sons and three daughters;
these are all, as it were, replaced. His wealth is replaced—so fully re-
placed that his daughters were able to inherit full and equal portions
alongside their brothers. Friends and relatives return to Job’s orbit
with consolation, camaraderie, and gifts. Job lives to the unusually
ripe old age of 140, and sees up to the blessed ideal of four generations.
His fame and reputation secure, he dies feeling a complete man. The
number schemes of the story’s opening return too. Job gets double the
animals: 14,000sheep1 6,000 camels; 1,000 teamsof cattle1 1,000don-
keys. He has another seven sons1 three daughters. He lives 140 years,
double the stereotypical or ideal 70. Within that, the number seven is
highlighted again: Job’s friends should bring seven bulls and seven
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rams. The 14,000 sheep and Job’s 140 years are multiples of seven. Job
has seven sons, to which the narrator gives extra emphasis by the use
not of the typical word for seven (shivʿ ah), but an artificial, dialectical-
sounding one (shivʿ anah), though the narrator is not himself, as it were,
from Utz (42:13). In qualitative terms, the narrator provides the evalu-
ative information that Job’s three new daughters were the most beau-
tiful anywhere (42:15) and that Job died content (42:17).
Yahweh is drawn with more nuance, speaking less formulaically
than in the opening scenes and less overwhelmingly than in the de-
bate, but he also sounds angry in a familiar, human way, which con-
tinues the motif found in both of his compromised character. He
repeats himself, saying to the friends twice, “You did not speak cor-
rectly of me like my subject Job did” (42:7–8). He refers to what he
would like to do to Job’s friends rather crassly as “outrageous things”
(nevalah). He stutters a bit and gets tripped upwhen he instructs them
to go to Job, using the expression “rather, except for, unless” (ki ʾim)
when it does not fit: “Go to Job and offer up a whole-burnt offering on
your account, and Job my subject will petition for you. Rather / Except
for / Unless his face will I countenance to avoid doing outrageous
things to you” (42:8).
Other aspects of the conclusion bely the sense of restoration and
the appearance of symmetry. The narrator provides the names of
Job’s three daughters, but not those of the sons, and like “Utz” and
“Job” they are symbolic: Yemimah, Qetsiah, and Qeren-hapukh, which
would evoke meanings like “Day-by-day,” “Cut-off,” and “Upside-
down-horn” (with foreigner’s pronunciation of ph as p), respectively.
These bizarre and troubling names generate two contradictory re-
sponses. On the one hand, they are so strange as to be almost laugh-
able. On the other hand, they suggest that Job has not actually healed.
Underneath the façade of restoration festers a continuing trauma. In
the same spirit, the moment chosen by the narrator to mention the
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return of Job’s relatives and friends leaves it ambiguous as to whether
they come after the material signs of his restoration, or beforehand
and are the beginning of his restoration: how sincere are their pre-
sence and concern? It also raises the question as to where they were
all this time. Why did the narrator not prepare for this moment? Cre-
ating such an ambiguity forces the audience to make do with what
can be said: the relatives and friends came around and material pos-
sessions came back; the elements are all there, but the linkage is
missing. Similarly, recalling the disjunctive repetition of “one day”
in the opening scenes, the narrator does not indicate how much time
has been passing, how long after the debate Yahweh begins restoring
Job, and how long his restoration takes—one day, a week, a year, ten
years. The effect of withholding a concrete sense of time makes the
segment schematic and not fully real.
In fact, the narrator gaps evenmore boldly. As odd as it was that in
the description of Job’s collapsing fortunes he forgot, as it were, to
mention Job’swife until shehad something to say to him, thenarrator
omits her completely from Job’s restoration. Did she die for her sug-
gestion to Job? Did Job divorce her? Does she refuse to be consoled?
By the same token, the satạn and the council that set the scene and
precipitated the complete turn of events do not return. Has the satạn
been banished, or is this a jobwell done? Does the satạn feel ashamed;
does he claim everyone is a winner; or does he scheme against Job in
some other way? The narrator provides the backstory—the divine
council and the system test—but does not return to it.
Yahweh, too, seems a contradictory character. He chastises Job for
audacious speech, which implies that Job’s friends spoke well. After
that, however, he chastises Eliphaz and the friends for what they said
of Yahweh, and he vindicates Job for what he said. Similarly, much of
the pathos in the debate between Job and his friends turned on the
rarity and overwhelming character of Yahweh’s appearance, which
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then occurs climactically with the sense of the near-miraculous. Af-
terward, though, Yahweh’s speech to Eliphaz is presented with no
fanfare at all, as an easy, regular, and unimpressive thing.
Finally, the story’s coherence founders on the very idea of restora-
tion. In addition to the wrinkle signaled by the names of Job’s daugh-
ters and the trauma they encode, the ten children, their families, and
all themasses of people in Job’shouseholdwhodied in the test cannot
be restored. Job may have the numbers back, but not those individual
people.More sharply, they did not deserve to die: the setupof the story,
that all this suffering befalls Job as part of a “system check,” now ap-
plies many times over to all those characters, each one of whom died
not for their sins but because someone else, Job, was perfect! The story
never admits this paradox.
All these formsof gappingand ambiguity,which undercut the sense
of relief and return, leave the audience with nagging questions. The
story has the form of restoration, a shadowy outline, but holes, too,
the elements of a counter-story, and fractures that threaten the coher-
ence and integrity of the story as a whole. It is tempting to infer that
separate works have been combined, but out of the various parts of
Job one cannot reconstruct even one complete and coherent story, let
alone two or three. For instance,what could Job andhis friends have said
such that Yahweh approves Job’s remarks and rejects those by the
friends? Surely not the opposite of their current positions in thedebate,
with Job claiming he deserved calamity even if he cannot recall the
egregious offense that warranted it, and the friends countering that
Job should not self-centeredly make it about himself, since Yahweh
is simply unpredictable and inscrutable. On the contrary, at the same
time that the story has its deep problems, each part has been concep-
tualized and formulated to set each other up and refer back and forth.
This seemingly impossible situation of a story that both holds to-
gether and falls apart amounts to an exploration of the nature and
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the limits of storytelling itself. The author has taken the most signif-
icant, themost vital instance of cause and effect in human experience,
fate and fortune in the biggest sense, ethics, divine reward and punish-
ment, to explore themost extreme limits of how it can beput into story
form.
It is standard for human beings to live by the story that misfortune
is punishment deserved. At the time of offense we were mindless of
what we were doing and now our frail human memory fails us, so
we search back and repent of what was done or we just repent gener-
ally. This is the premise of the law of the cleansing sacrifice (hạtṭạ̄t,
regularly mistranslated “sin-offering”) in Leviticus 4–5. And it was
standard in ancient Israel and Judea to think that the members of a
family are interdependent and that it was an act of divine patience
and compassion to fraction out punishment over several generations
to keep the family line alive. Misfortune could be explained as the re-
sult of an earlier cause, an ancestor’s misdeed, handled by a patient
and loving deity. This is a story: “My ancestor committed an offense
and I suffer a fraction of it, and this is how Yahweh keeps alive my
family line as a whole.” The story of Job poses a conundrum that ex-
cludes the possibility of these stories of individual and family guilt:
What if therewere amanwhowas truly perfect, whose behavior rules
outmisdeeds and forgetting them? He knows for sure he has done no
wrong and he keeps perfect account of his children. The devastation
that befalls him is so total that it cannot be about him or his predeces-
sors. What does that man do? What story does he tell? Can a story,
any story, account for this?
The author works at two levels, doubling the challenge. There is
the story Job will tell of himself and there is the story to tell about
Job, howhis situation arose andhow itwas resolved. Job refuses to tell
a new story. He sticks to his own broken story. There is a situation
now, his misery, and there is a situation before, his perfect faithful-
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ness; and they do not make a story. They are not cause and effect. He
suffers, and there is no just explanation. The friends refuse to accept
Job’s nonstory. They push and push to corner him into telling the tra-
ditional story, the only just story they know: Job must have done
something wrong. If Job is right, their ideas of life and how to live it
are at risk. If the devastation centered on him has nothing to do with
his behavior, what happens to their petty lives? This is a debate of
the highest stakes. For Job, the only way out is for Yahweh to show
up and at the very least affirm that Job does not suffer for a cause that
lies with him, and this is just what Yahweh does. He berates Job’s ar-
rogance in calling onhim, but he does not force a new story. He offers
another nonstory, a non sequitur: Yahweh knows all, does all, and
manages all, so that’s that. Job can be humble because he can be
pleased; his refusal to tell a story has been affirmed.
For the story about Job, the author chooses to put the necessary but
unrealistic pieces into play, creating a story that hangs by the thin-
nest, most fragile of threads. There is a mythic backstory with Yah-
weh prompted by the satạn, a wife whose only point of view is that
of the man, and three unfriendly friends, three hostile consolers.
There is what counts formally as a conclusion, but which really does
not achieve proper closure. The author creates the sense of an ending,
without actually providing one, the appearance of symmetry without
its content. It is the theater of the absurd. Readers are pushed to the
limits of what they can tolerate: a mythic background, a compro-
mised God, justice threatened, a story, the ultimatehumanstory, hang-
ing by a thread always on the verge of snapping. And yet, the story just
works, because by the end the audience somehow forgets the begin-
ning, or pushes it out of mind just enough. The audience always reads
withone eye closed, the beginningwithout theendand the endwithout
the beginning, and insists somehow on making Job’s story work.
In short, the book of Job is not a story about how God runs the
world. It is a story illustrating how human beings survive in it.
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V. Conclusion
At least two culturally defined and definable spheres of experience
served ancient Israelians and Judeans in their construction of knowl-
edge, the royal and the domestic.25 The royal sphere, wrapped in the
control of amounts of matter and numbers of people several magni-
tudes beyond the average, pointed to its visible, tangible accomplish-
ments as evidence of divine will and expressed that certainty in writ-
ing. It can be construed as a spatial, horizontal knowledge. Two
literary forms arose or crystallized in its orbit and attenuate its claims,
the prophetic, which claimed unmediated, direct knowledge of divine
will and voiced itself in competing first and second persons, and the
anonymous, omniscient narrative voiced in the third person that re-
counts the foundational and even recent past. The domestic sphere,
centered on household durability, took a family’s very existence with
identity intact as an indication that the accumulatedwisdomof causes
and effects—above all divine—has been successfully communicated
and transmitted down generations. It can be construed as a temporal,
vertical knowledge. The literary forms that arose from or crystallized
this experience of household life transposed that certainty to the liter-
ary medium in instructional genres of varied voicing and scope, as
reams of pithy sayings, series of riddles, and scenes of direct address
voiced by different characters, whether named individuals or arche-
types.
These written genres of certain knowledge—prophetic, narrative,
and proverbial—drew reactions, counterarguments, by varied au-
thors. In the face of a dramatic turn of events that seemed an oppor-
tunity but enjoyed no tangible proof, the author of Isaiah 40–48 re-
conceptualized the deity and history as so far beyond the senses and
so utterly singular as to be identifiable and appreciable by sheer will
alone. Bolstering the case, the author exploited the textual medium,
which had long been employed to present itself as a record of a pro-
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phetic voice, such that the prophetic voicewould speak directly, in real
time, with every reading. Twomore, of unknownhistorical prompting,
presented clear-eyed views of the nature of human self-delusion and
its genres of cause and effect. The author of Qohelet exploded the pro-
verbial packing of quotidian knowledge for transmission across gener-
ations, in a prose lecture demonstrating its fatal flaws and, further-
more, situated that lecture within a failed act of transmission. The
author of Job illustrated the unreliability of narrative as explanation,
a form so dearly held by human beings as to be asserted and applied
even in the most untenable of circumstances, when the divine sphere
attacks the domestic for its very faithfulness. Both authors deny the
knowability of divine will, the one by asserting divine aloofness, the
other by presenting an irreverent parody. And both, in the course of ex-
ploiting the textual medium, rely on length to facilitate audience for-
getfulness and drive home their point, that human beings schematize
and assert coherence by selective attentiveness.
In addition to Isaiah 40–48with its references to Cyrus and the cap-
ture of Babylon, Qohelet and Job bear signs—primarily linguistic—of
the Persian period, in the sixth–fourth centuries BCE. It is tempting
to attribute their authors’ ruthless clarity to living in a period when
imperialmultinational control replaced native kingship, to a postmo-
narchic mood, and mark it as a stage in the development of Israelite-
Jewish thought. But the author of Isaiah 40–48 seems to have turned
back on his own insights several decades later in Judea, in Isaiah
49–66, and by the same criteria applied to Job and Qohelet, the book
of Ruth, which seems so wistful about kingship, comes from the same
period. The case is uncertain and can be overstated. The ancient read-
ers of the materials eventually collected as a single Bible considered
those materials to be as eclectic, exploitable, adaptable, and extend-
able as they were normative; they found in them not just divine
knowledge, but the stuff out of which to fashion more. Rather than
schematize and narrativize Jewish literary and religious develop-
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ments (often in the context of subsequent, Christian ones), contem-
porary readers of the Hebrew Bible would do best to recognize it and
engage it as an ancient treasury of more ancient varied materials—
earlier treasuries and compositions—of no exclusive or essential fea-
tures, no single divine message or truth, no natural trajectory, but
whose contents lend themselves to contemporary probing for sa-
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